

## **SEMANTIC AND STRUCTURAL PECULIARITIES OF INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS WITH AN IMPERATIVE MEANING**

*The study has proved structural and semantic complexity and variability of indirect speech acts with an imperative meaning.*

*According to their structural peculiarities, all indirect speech acts with imperative meaning can be divided into two groups. The utterances of the first one convey the imperative meaning by two ways: grammatically or lexically. Speech acts like that are called explicit.*

*The second group is represented by the sentences which have no markers of imperativeness; their illocutionary meaning is expressed implicitly.*

*The mechanism of imperative meaning formation in implicit utterances can be described in the following way: if a speaker has any information about the possibility (necessity, desirability etc.) of transforming the existing situation into the new one, and that transformation corresponds to the interests of the hearer, the speaker's statement serves to cause the hearer to perform certain actions. It was also shown that the meaning of an implicit imperative utterance is formed by a complex interaction of extralinguistic factors. Above all, it is the speaker's intention or the goals he wants to achieve with his statement, i. e. what actions he expects from the hearer. The nature of the relationships of interlocutors is also relevant. The realising of the communicative situation helps to understand the illocutionary point of the speaker and therefore the illocutionary force of an utterance.*

*In fact, the use of indirect speech acts – which can often have allusion, hint, irony, sarcasm – can make communication more expressive and esthetically valuable.*

**Keywords:** *indirect speech acts; illocutionary force; illocutionary point; explicit utterances; implicit utterances; communicative situation.*

In the process of communication every person tends to choose the most effective language structures to influence the interlocutor in order to provide successful interaction. The choice of the language instruments may be determined by different extralinguistic factors such as the level of the speaker's lingual competence, his speaking habits, the manner of expressing ideas and feelings and other peculiarities of the speaker's idiolect. When the speaker uses only the language in which the form (e. g. imperative mood) corresponds to its meaning (e. g. giving an order), it makes his speech poorer, less expressive and sometimes even impolite (compare, for example: *Close the door!* and *Could you close the door?*) since direct commands are usually appropriate for situations where the listener is obliged to perform certain actions, for instance, in the army or police forces. However being communicated as an indirect speech act (e. g. an interrogative sentence that is used as a request: *Would you mind helping me with these boxes?*), an utterance becomes more polite as well as more eloquent, gaining additional illocutionary force. So, the study of structural and semantic peculiarities of indirect speech acts that have an imperative meaning is the task of this article.

The term «a speech act» was introduced by the Oxford philosopher J. L. Austin who paid particular attention to the fact that a statement the main function of which is to inform the hearer about something, can also serve to

perform many other actions: «It has come to be commonly held that many utterances that look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts: for example, 'ethical propositions' are perhaps intended, solely or partly, to evince emotion or to prescribe conduct or to influence it in special ways» [1, p. 3]. So, in the communicative process people not only pronounce sentences, but also use them as requests, advice, warning, threat etc; and all these sentences are speech acts.

The developing of the speech act theory approach was supported by the attention to the functional aspect of linguistic phenomena. It became apparent that similarity of disparate language forms is determined by functional identity rather than by formal resemblance of grammatical categories and meanings. This attitude caused the enhanced interest in pragmatics, the actuality of which had not been recognised by traditional science for long. In contrast to classical linguists, pragmatists focus on «what is not *explicitly* stated and on how we interpret utterances in situational contexts» [2, p. 6]. They are not concerned so much with «the sense of what is said as with its *force*, that is, with what is communicated by the manner and style of an utterance» [2, p. 6].

The main object of a pragmatic research is a speech act which is pronounced by the speaker and is addressed to the hearer. A speech act is analyzed on different levels:

locution, illocution and perlocution. According to J. L. Austin, a locutionary act «is the performance of an utterance: the actual utterance and its ostensible meaning, comprising phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts corresponding to the verbal, syntactic and semantic aspects of any meaningful utterance»; an illocutionary act is «the pragmatic ‘illocutionary force’ of the utterance, thus its intended significance as a socially valid verbal action»; and a perlocutionary act is «its actual effect, such as persuading, convincing, scaring, enlightening, inspiring, or otherwise getting someone to do or realize something, whether intended or not» [1, p. 12].

However linguists mostly focused on an illocutionary act as the way to cause non-verbal action by language means. Thus, scientists (P. F. Strawson, J. R. Searle, D. Gordon, G. Lakoff and others) studied illocutionary acts aimed at being a «verbal action», for example, drawing attention (*Look!*), asking for information (*What time is it?*), warning (*It can be dangerous!*), asking to do something (*Can you pass me the salt, please?*).

An illocutionary act is also defined as «the type of function a speaker intends to accomplish in the course of producing an utterance» and «defined within a system of social conventions» [7, p. 128].

All the speech acts – both direct and indirect – have an illocutionary force that is «the speaker’s intention in producing that utterance» [1, p. 15]. Thus, if John says to Mary *Can you pass me the glasses, please*, he performs the illocutionary act of requesting or ordering Mary to hand the glasses over to him. The functions or actions just mentioned are also referred to as the illocutionary force or *illocutionary point* of the speech act. The illocutionary force of a speech act is the effect a speech act is intended to have by a speaker. Indeed, the term ‘speech act’ in its narrow sense is often taken to refer specifically to illocutionary act also known as ‘illocution’. [7, p. 148–149].

Searle and Vanderveken go on to define illocutionary force in terms of seven features, claiming that every possible illocutionary force may be identified with a septuple of such values. The features are:

- 1) illocutionary point;
- 2) degree of strength of the illocutionary point;
- 3) mode of achievement (the special way in which the illocutionary point of a speech act must be achieved);
- 4) content conditions (appropriate propositional content);
- 5) preparatory conditions (all other conditions that must be met for the speech act not to misfire);
- 6) sincerity conditions (the expression of a psychological state);
- 7) degree of strength of the sincerity conditions.

Searle and Vanderveken suggest, in light of these seven characteristics, that each illocutionary force may be defined as a septuple of values, each of which is a «setting» of a value within one of the seven characteristics. It follows, according to this suggestion, that two illocutionary forces *F1* and *F2* are identical just in case they correspond to the same septuple. [6, p. 119–132].

The ability to understand the illocutionary force of an utterance is significant, however it is vitally important for cross-cultural communication «since the same form (e. g. ‘When are you leaving?’) can vary in its illocutionary force depending on the context in which it is made (e. g.

‘May I have a ride with you?’ or ‘Don’t you think it is time for you to go?’)» [4, p. 75].

According to their structural peculiarities, all indirect speech acts with imperative meaning can be divided into two groups. The utterances of the first one convey the imperative meaning by two ways:

1) **grammatically** with the help of:

– subjunctive or indicative verbs which are used to express demands, instructions or requests:

*‘If you don’t find a house soon,’ she said, ‘I shall have to reconsider my position’ (W. Somerset Maugham).*

(Compare: *‘Find a house as quickly as possible!’*).

*‘I can’t undo it,’ she said. ‘Mr Kelada will just have to take my word for it’ (W. Somerset Maugham).*

(Compare: *‘Mr Kelada, take my word for it!’*);

– interrogative constructions which commonly serve as polite request. Unlike the questions that serve to ask for information, the main function of indirect interrogative utterances is to cause the hearer to perform certain action: the speaker expects the hearer to do something rather than answer his question.

*‘Why don’t you bring George to lunch with me?’*

*‘I’ll ask him. I should think he’d love to come’ (W. Somerset Maugham).*

(Compare: *‘Invite George to lunch!’*);

– structures like complex object, *I wish* etc.:

*‘I want you to wake me in time for the first boat,’ he said» (W. Somerset Maugham).*

(Compare: *‘Leave my boat!’*);

*James, I wish you would be more careful about your language (W. Somerset Maugham).*

(Compare: *‘Use appropriate language!’*);

2) and also **lexically** by using:

– modals:

*‘You must go up and see her, George!’*

*‘Me!’ he cried in astonishment, a little in terror.*

*‘You must go as if you came from your father, to say we won’t have anything more to do with her and she’s not to write’ (W. Somerset Maugham).*

(Compare: *‘Go and see her, George!’*);

– performatives:

*‘I have been hard and cruel towards you... On my knees I beg your forgiveness ...» (W. Somerset Maugham).*

(Compare: *‘Forgive me!’*);

– phrases like *had better, would rather*:

*‘You’d better speak to him, Edith» (W. Somerset Maugham).*

(Compare: *‘Speak to him, Edith!’*).

Speech acts like that are called **explicit**.

The second group is represented by the sentences which have no markers of imperativeness; their illocutionary meaning is expressed implicitly:

*‘The carriage was ordered for five o’clock and at ten minutes to, the countess, dressed for her drive, sent for José. When he came into the drawing-room, wearing his pale grey livery with such an air, she could not deny that he was very good to look upon.*

*‘A Greek god’, the countess murmured to herself. ‘It is only Andalusia that can produce such types.’ And then aloud: ‘I hear that you are going to marry the daughter of the Duchess of Dos Palos’.*

*‘If the countess does not object’.*

*She shrugged her shoulders.*

*'Whoever you marry is a matter of complete indifference to me... But I think it only right to tell you that I have a rooted objection to married coachmen. On your wedding day you leave my service. That is all I had to say to you. You can go'» (W. Somerset Maugham).*

(Compare: *'Don't marry the daughter of the Duchess of Dos Palos!'*).

Unlike explicit speech acts, the imperative meaning of implicit utterances is not conveyed with the help of language means; however the latter ones are informative enough to be understood by the hearer.

In modern linguistic studies it is highlighted that modal meaning of a sentence tends to be expressed implicitly. The implicitness is the feature of modality in general, and of imperativeness in particular.

The mechanism of imperative meaning formation in implicit utterances can be described in the following way: if a speaker has any information about the possibility (necessity, desirability etc.) of transforming the existing situation into the new one, and that transformation corresponds to the interests of the hearer, the speaker's statement serves to cause the hearer to perform certain actions. Such utterances generally take the form of advice or recommendation, for example:

*«You seem pretty fit today and I don't suppose you want to stay in this God-forsaken place longer than you must. I've sent over the river to arrange for a couple of prahus to take you down to the coast. They'll be here at six tomorrow morning» (W. Somerset Maugham).*

(Compare: *'Leave my house at six o'clock tomorrow morning!'*).

The following context explains the motive of the speaker:

*«Skelton felt sure then that he was right; Grange knew or guessed that his wife had spoken too freely, and he wanted to be rid as soon as possible of the dangerous visitor» (W. Somerset Maugham).*

The analysis of indirect illocutionary statements proved the importance of an evaluative component in creating some varieties of imperative meaning: i. e. requests, advice, requirements. It was found that the operation of the motivations expressed in one of these varieties depends on the characteristics of speech situation that created them: the participants and character of their relationships as well as the attitude towards motivated action. These factors affect the component structure of illocutionary utterance meaning in determining the specific features of each of its varieties.

In fact, it is the context or the consituation that let the hearer understand the implicit illocutionary meaning of an indirect speech act. The meaning of an implicit imperative utterance, and therefore its component structure, is formed by a complex interaction of extralinguistic factors. Above all, it is the speaker's intention or the goals he wants to achieve with his statement, i. e. what actions he expects from the hearer. The nature of the relationships of interlocutors is also relevant, these are such factors as equality/inequality of social roles, age and so on., i. e. features that contribute to a dominant position of one of the communicants and dependence of the other one. The fact which of the participants of the situation – the

speaker or the hearer – is interested in performing the action is also significant.

If an action caused is important for the speaker himself rather than for the hearer, the declaration of his/her personal interests can also have the imperative meaning.

Evaluating the present situation or state as negative or deviant, the speaker expose his wish to change the situation and causes the hearer for certain actions, for example:

*'I haven't spoken to a white person for two years. I've been longing for a good old talk' (W. Somerset Maugham).*

In this case, the speech act will take the form of a request (Compare: *'Stay and talk to me!'*).

The important factor of imperative meaning creation in indirect speech acts is such feature of a communicative situation as interlocutors' relationships. Thus, if the hearer is obliged to perform the speaker's orders or just wants to satisfy the speaker, and the speaker is concerned about that, a non-imperative utterance will have the effect of causation.

Let's take, for instance, the situation in a restaurant or a club when a girl says to her admirer:

*'Oh, this is my favourite song!' – it's quite possible that this statement will have the effect of an imperative and will cause the boy to invite the girl to a dance.*

If the hearer doesn't have to, or isn't able to, or just doesn't want to satisfy the speaker's desires, and the speaker doesn't expect that, the utterance won't have the illocutionary force: the same sentence (*'Oh, this is my favourite song!'*) addressed to another girl can hardly ever – maybe never – have the effect of causation.

It's possible to follow some other stereotyped situations which make existence of implicit utterances possible. These are situations in which the participants of the communication have conventional social roles, and indirect speech acts used in that context traditionally serve as requests. For example, utterances like: *Doctor! Police!* which cause the hearers to call the doctor or the police. These are so called elliptical constructions in which the imperative verb is omitted (compare: *Call the doctor! Call the police!*).

So, in order to understand an implicit utterance with an imperative meaning, it is necessary to realize the communicative situation that may refer to any aspects of an occasion in which a speech act takes place, including the social setting and the status of both the speaker and the person who's addressed.

The realising of the communicative situation helps to understand the illocutionary point of the speaker and therefore the illocutionary force of an utterance.

So, the study has proved structural and semantic complexity and variability of indirect speech acts with an imperative meaning; it has also shown that when the speaker causes an action indirectly (without using verbs in imperative mood), he/she can enhance the emotionality of an utterance, in that way creating convincing motivation for the hearer in that way increasing the illocutory force of a speech act. In fact, the use of indirect speech acts – which can often have allusion, hint, irony, sarcasm – can make communication more expressive and esthetically valuable.

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### СЕМАНТИЧНІ ТА СТРУКТУРНІ ОСОБЛИВОСТІ НЕПРЯМИХ МОВНИХ АКТИВ, ЩО ВИРАЖАЮТЬ СПОНУКАННЯ

*Дослідження підтвердило існуючу в мовознавстві думку про можливість надавання імперативного значення неімперативним мовним формам. Вивчення непрямих директивних мовленнєвих актів продемонструвало той факт, що вони мають складнішу організацію та специфічніші засоби вираження комунікативного наміру мовця порівняно з імперативними спонукальними конструкціями. Це модально-часове оформлення висловлювання, яке створюється вживанням певних дієслівних форм, подання спонукання в питально-заперечній формі, а також наявність у структурі неімперативного висловлювання лексичних маркерів спонукальності. Показано також значущість контексту у відображенні характеристик мовленнєвої ситуації, які забезпечують необхідну мотивацію спонукуваної дії. Саме знання ситуації дозволяє слухачеві прийняти мотиваційний потенціал висловлення, а отже, і його іллокутивну силу.*

*Аналіз розглянутих конструкцій довів, що виражаючи спонукання в непрямий спосіб, мовець може посилити експресивність висловлення, що сприяє створенню переконливої мотивації для слухача у виконанні дії, а отже, і збільшенню іллокутивної сили висловлювання. Іронія, сарказм, тонкі натяки, емоційні сплески, органічні для непрямих спонукальних висловлювань, визначають їхню роль як конструкцій, що не тільки забезпечують процес мовної комунікації, а й надають йому естетичної цінності.*

**Ключові слова:** *непрямі директивні мовленнєві акти; іллокутивна сила; іллокутивний намір; експліцитні висловлювання; імпліцитні висловлювання; мовленнєва ситуація.*

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### СЕМАНТИЧЕСКИЕ И СТРУКТУРНЫЕ ОСОБЕННОСТИ КОСВЕННЫХ РЕЧЕВЫХ АКТОВ, ВЫРАЖАЮЩИХ ПОБУЖДЕНИЕ

*Проведенное исследование показало структуро-семантическую сложность и неоднозначность косвенных речевых актов, выражающих побуждение. В соответствии с их структурой все косвенные речевые акты можно разделить на две группы. Высказывания первой имеют лексико-грамматические маркеры побудительного значения. Такие речевые акты называются эксплицитными. Вторая группа косвенных речевых актов представлена предложениями, которые не имеют признаков императивности; их иллокутивный смысл выражен имплицитно.*

*Механизм формирования побудительности в имплицитных высказываниях можно описать следующим образом: если говорящий имеет информацию, касающуюся возможности (необходимости, желательности и т. д.) трансформации существующей ситуации, и такое изменение соответствует интересам собеседника, то в этом случае высказывание, имеющее форму утверждения, побуждает адресата совершить определенные действия. Выяснилось, что значение имплицитного императивного высказывания обуславливается сложным взаимодействием экстралингвистических факторов. Это, например, намерение говорящего, а также цели, которые он хочет достичь своим высказыванием, то есть чего он хочет добиться от собеседника. Характер отношений участников общения также является релевантным. Понимание языковой ситуации способствует пониманию иллокутивного намерения говорящего, а значит и иллокутивной силы высказывания.*

*Надо отметить, что использование косвенных речевых актов, которые часто содержат аллюзии, намеки, иронию, сарказм, позволяет повысить экспресивность общения и придать ему большую эстетическую ценность.*

**Ключевые слова:** *косвенные директивные речевые акты; иллокутивная сила; иллокутивное намерение; эксплицитные высказывания, имплицитные высказывания, речевая ситуация.*